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Abstract
In human-machine communication (HMC), machines are communicative subjects in the 
creation of meaning. The Computers are Social Actors and constructivist approaches to 
HMC postulate that humans communicate with machines as if they were people. From 
this perspective, communication is understood as heavily scripted where humans mind-
lessly apply human-to-human scripts in HMC. We argue that a critical approach to com-
munication scripts reveals how humans may rely on ableism as a means of sense-making 
in their relationships with machines. Using the choose-your-own-adventure game Detroit: 
Become Human as a case study, we demonstrate (a) how ableist communication scripts ren-
der machines as both less-than-human and superhuman and (b) how such scripts manifest 
in control and cyborg anxiety. We conclude with theoretical and design implications for 
rescripting ableist communication scripts.
Keywords: human-machine communication, ableism, control, cyborg anxiety,  
Computers are Social Actors (CASA)
Introduction
Human-Machine Communication (HMC) refers to both a new area of research and concept 
within communication, defined as “the creation of meaning among humans and machines” 
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technology is no longer a tool or the medium for communication, but a communicator itself 
(Guzman, 2018). This has far-reaching implications for the communication discipline inas-
much as “HMC ‘frees’ the machine from its relegation to the role of medium and, as a result, 
communication itself is loosed from a definition based on the ontology of participants” 
(Guzman, 2018, pp. 17–18). As such, “the machine has become a communicative subject” 
(Guzman, 2018, p. 12). Yet, the question remains, how do we treat that communicative 
subject? The Computers are Social Actors (CASA) approach postulates that humans fun-
damentally understand and relate to computers, machines, and technologies as if they were 
other people (Nass & Moon, 2000). CASA has been one of the most influential perspectives 
in HMC because it serves as a theoretical foundation for understanding how machines are 
treated as a communicative subject in human-machine interactions. The CASA approach 
applies an understanding of communication as heavily scripted, such that communication 
is a largely automatic process where certain triggers activate communication scripts in a 
“click, whirr” fashion (Cialdini, 2009; Westerman et al., 2020). Complementing this scripted 
approach, A. Edwards et al. (2019) propose a constructivist research paradigm in HMC 
wherein “people seek to employ the same judgement and interaction patterns developed 
for use with other people in their communication with machine partners” (p. 312). These 
lines of scholarship have demonstrated that various communication theories originally for-
mulated for human-human interactions can also provide valuable insights in the human- 
machine context (Fortunati et al., 2020; Westerman et al., 2020). We contend, however, 
that critical communication perspectives have been largely absent from this work. Building 
upon previous work that explores the scripted nature of communication in HMC, we argue 
that a critical perspective is a promising avenue for a deeper interrogation of how humans 
make sense of their interactions with machines. 
A critical perspective on a constructivist research paradigm in HMC attunes us to the 
ubiquitous yet powerful societal systems of oppression that guide communication scripts: 
structures such as heteronormativity and Whiteness that have been intensively theorized 
by critical communication scholars. Among these pervasive social scripts, we hold that 
ableism may be an alluring but dangerous script humans may rely on to make sense of 
differences between humans and machines, in spite of (or arguably because) machines are 
becoming increasingly human-like. As a system of beliefs, practices, and processes, ableism 
refers to the cultural construction of a “normal” body and conceives of any deviation from 
that “normal” body as lack thereof—be it in the form of disability or extraordinary abilities 
(Cherney, 2019). In this essay, we are not so much concerned about “actual” ontological 
differences between humans and machines (e.g., A. P. Edwards, 2018; Guzman, 2020), but 
rather how a constructivist approach to HMC illustrates the ways humans perceive and con-
struct machines as communicative subjects. Although different abilities between humans 
and machines are oftentimes a matter of design and technology, an ableist framework high-
lights how different cap/abilities are constructed and interpreted culturally. As humans’ 
interactions with social robots are likely going to increase in the near future, it is imperative 
to evaluate the risk attached to ableist understandings of the differences in machines’ tech-
nological cap/abilities. In particular, an ableist framework may result in foreclosing authen-
tic human engagement with machines or lead to the exclusion and rejection of machines, 
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akin to society’s treatment of disabled people (Johnson & Kennedy, 2020).1 We argue that as 
machines are simultaneously rendered as both less-than-human/disabled (lacking techno-
logical cap/abilities and/or “true” emotions) and more-than-human (increased processing 
power and physical cap/abilities of machines), humans may be tempted to quickly charac-
terize machines through the cognitive shortcut of ableism. In accordance with a construc-
tivist approach in HMC, we explore the implications of how ableist communication scripts 
may influence how humans make sense of machines and thereby make sense of themselves.
This paper begins with a review of CASA and constructivist literature in HMC, not-
ing the ways in which a critical perspective can supplement current understandings. We 
especially highlight how a posthuman and critical approach to disability “allows us to think 
across binaries of self/other, nature/technology and human/machine” (Goodley et al., 2014, 
p. 348). To illustrate our claims and highlight how ableist communication scripts may play 
out in human-machine interactions, we turn to the case of Detroit: Become Human (DBH; 
Quantic Dream, 2018), an android-centered video game that invites the player to develop 
parasocial interactions with android characters (Craig et al., 2020, Leach & Dehnert, in 
press) and explore what it means to be(come) human in a world full of humanoid machines. 
In DBH, androids face ableist discrimination both for being less-than-human and super-
human at the same time, exerted through various types of control and fueled by cyborg 
anxiety (i.e., the fear that the performance and embodiment of a disabled person exposes 
the porous and permeable boundaries of what it means to be an able-bodied and able-
minded human). Finally, we conclude with future directions for research in both HMC and 
human-human communication (HHC) contexts.
Mobilizing a Critical Perspective in Human-Machine  
Communication
With a focus on the meaning-making processes between humans and machines, one of 
the central tenets in HMC is arguably the ontological shift for communication technology 
(e.g., robots, algorithms, artificial intelligence [AI], etc.) from channel to communicator 
(Gunkel, 2012; Guzman, 2018; Peter & Kühne, 2018). In other words, rather than operating 
as the medium in HHC that people talk through, the machine takes on the role of commu-
nicator that people talk with. Understanding the machine as a communicative subject raises 
the question of how humans engage with this communicative other. Ontological differ-
ences between humans and machines play an important role in this regard (A. P. Edwards, 
2018; Gunkel, 2012; Guzman, 2020; Sandry, 2018), but we can also examine how humans 
treat and relate to machines as if they were other people through a Computers are Social 
1. As communication scholars, we are sensitive of the words and terms we use and thus deliberately use 
phrases such as “the disabled,” “disabled people,” and “nondisabled people.” Rather than the common  
person-first approach, we see this choice as a “rhetorical practice that challenges ableist rhetoric”  
(Cherney, 2019, p. 24). Critical and posthuman disability studies take a social model framework to  
disability, where disability is understood as a culture (or multiple cultures). As Makkawy and Moreman 
(2019) poignantly note, “Like the cultural signifiers of Latinx and even queer, we would not say person 
of Latinx or person of queerness” (p. 414n1, emphasis in original). Finally, our use of the terms “disabled 
people” and “nondisabled people” foregrounds “the way that society strips humanity from the disabled 
through oppressive ableist practices” (Cherney, 2019, p. 24).
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Actors (CASA) framework (Nass & Moon, 2000). Importantly, CASA does not apply to 
every machine or technology. Instead, CASA focuses on media agents: “any technological 
artifact that demonstrates sufficient social cues to indicate the potential to be a source of 
social interaction” (Gambino et al., 2020, p. 73). Essentially, CASA posits that people are 
likely to apply social scripts from HHC when interacting with machines that possess social 
cues and function as communicators (Krämer et al., 2012; Nass & Moon, 2000). 
From a CASA perspective, communication is viewed as heavily scripted. Based on 
previous interactions and experiences, scripts function as mental representations or heu-
ristic shortcuts to make sense of situations, interactions, or people, and these scripts are 
perpetually reified through ongoing interactions (Cialdini, 2009; Nass & Moon, 2000). 
CASA holds that humans utilize communication scripts developed in an HHC context 
when interacting with machines. This is conceptualized as a mindless process as people 
use social cues of machines as a heuristic to resort to learned and constantly reified social 
scripts in the moment of interaction (Nass & Moon, 2000). Given that people often apply 
the same social scripts used with human communicators to machines, theories that explain 
these HHC processes should be applicable to HMC, such as interpersonal and computer- 
mediated communication theories (see Westerman et al., 2020, for an overview). HMC 
has also seen a turn toward a constructivist approach to human-machine interactions. A 
constructivist perspective holds that “people accumulate and integrate communication 
knowledge, tendencies, and abilities through previous interactions, and that those form the 
basis of later social cognitive and message construction behaviors” (A. Edwards et al., 2019, 
p. 312). From a constructivist perspective, communication scripts applied to HMC are the 
result of previous interactions and exposure to discourse about machines, where “our social 
interactions unfold first and foremost through a process of prototyping the potentially com-
municative other” (p. 312). Together, constructivism and CASA explain the ways in which 
humans treat machines as if they were people by applying communication scripts that are 
continually (re)constructed through discourse about and interactions with machines.
While the move toward a constructivist paradigm has transformed understandings 
of both HMC and HHC (Westerman et al., 2020), we contend that critical communica-
tion perspectives have been largely absent from these conversations. Critical perspectives 
in communication seek not only to understand the undergirding structures that guide 
human communication (i.e., scripts), but also how these scripts are indicative of power and 
social hierarchies. Additionally, critical approaches are united by an emancipatory impetus 
striving for social change. From a critical perspective, social scripts are borne from larger 
systems of belief (e.g., racism, sexism, or ableism) that guide people’s worldview and inter-
actions. Moreover, while humans and machines should be considered as different (humans 
are not machines) but complimentary (both are inherently valuable for different reasons), 
a critical perspective shows that differences are often cast in binaries where one form of 
identity is rendered as normal and desirable (e.g., Whiteness, masculinity, able-bodiedness) 
and other expressions of identity are cast as abnormal and deviant (e.g., Black, Indigenous, 
and people of color, femininity, disability). These scripts focused on difference apply even 
to human-machine interactions. In this paper, we focus specifically on ableism and how 
this lens generates scripts that guide HMC and sensemaking. As machines become more 
human-like, ableism may be a tempting script humans mindlessly rely on to make sense of 
the technological and design differences between humans and machines.
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Ableism: The Posthuman Machine and Cyborg Anxiety
We argue that bringing ableism in conversation with HMC is worthwhile, given that “the 
core of ableism is an idealized norm that defines what it means to be human” (Cherney, 
2019, p. 8). Broadly speaking, ableism is a societal structure, a network of beliefs, commu-
nication practices, and institutional processes that describes a corporeal standard. Ableism 
casts an idea of a “normal” body and mind and ultimately speaks to the question of what it 
means to be human (cf. Van Trigt et al., 2016). Traditional ideologies surrounding ableism 
support an “ableist conflation” that equates disabilities to pain and suffering (Reynolds, 
2017). Extending this logic, an ableist discourse posits that the only life worth living is one 
lived by the nondisabled, and that those who are disabled deserve either pity or contempt. 
Disability studies scholars consistently show how the economic, political, and social condi-
tion of neoliberalism demands an abled, normative corporeal standard (e.g., Goodley, 2014; 
McRuer, 2006). From a neoliberal perspective, bodies must be flexible and productive (read: 
neither disabled nor extraordinarily abled) in order to meet the strenuous requirements of 
neoliberal capitalism. When a society privileges such a discourse, the nondisabled are more 
likely to engage in communicative processes that otherize the disabled, which can be an 
intentional or unintentional choice (Mik-Meyer, 2016). One way in which ableist discourses 
play out is through different types of control, as we explore in more detail below.
More recently, critical disability studies aim to deconstruct the disabled/abled binary 
and integrate perspectives from postcolonial, queer, and feminist theories into the study 
of disability (Goodley, 2014; Goodley et al., 2019). Goodley et al. (2014) explicitly align 
the project of critical disability studies with posthuman thought and argue that “disability 
is the quintessential posthuman condition” (p. 348, emphasis in original). Albeit valuable 
critiques of posthuman and critical disability studies that center mostly on its ethical and 
political applicability (e.g., Meekosha & Shuttleworth, 2009; Vehmas & Watson, 2014), 
we utilize this perspective as it works the disabled/abled binary, shifts the focus from the 
disabled body to the ideological system of ableism, and thus has “an antithetical attitude 
towards the taken-for-granted, ideological and normative under-girdings of what it means 
to be a valued citizen of society” (Goodley et al., 2014, p. 348). As a critique of human-
ism’s anthropocentrism, Van Trigt et al. (2016) argue for “understand[ing] the posthuman 
condition as one in which we constantly reflect on humanity rather than as a condition 
beyond humanity” (p. 126). Thus, quite similarly to HMC’s critique of the anthropocen-
tricity of communication, “disability allows us to think across binaries of self/other, nature/ 
technology and human/machine” (Goodley et al., 2014, p. 348), thereby decentering the 
human.
Our goal is not to frame ableism as an analytic for explaining actual ontological dif-
ferences between humans and machines, which are often justified by technological limits 
or design choices. Rather, we propose ableism as one societal structure that undergirds 
humans’ communicative scripts that may be applied from a human-human context to make 
sense of HMC and to judge the communicative machine-other. In short, we seek to compli-
cate constructivist and CASA approaches to HMC from a critical perspective. For instance, 
some children have been shown to see the robot DORO as a child younger than themselves 
or as disabled (Fortunati et al., 2020). As such, our approach is distinct from what has been 
articulated as “technoableism” (Shew, 2020) or “crip technoscience” (Hamraie & Fritsch, 
142 Human-Machine Communication 
2019). These perspectives theorize the technological enhancement of disabled people and 
must grapple with ableist discourses of “overcoming” or “curing” disability, oftentimes from 
a transhumanist perspective (Wolbring, 2009). Common examples in this view of ableism 
and technology are cochlear implants, exoskeletons, or proposed cures for autism (Shew, 
2020; Wolbring, 2009). One key concept of relevance to our project that is theorized at the 
intersections of dis/ability and technology is Donna Haraway’s cyborg.
While the usefulness and appropriateness of Haraway’s cyborg theory for disability 
studies has been widely contested in the field (e.g., Reeve, 2012), the notion of a cyborg 
anxiety proves useful as it relates to the perception of a disabled person as cyborg. Again, 
we are not so much concerned with ontology (i.e., whether a person/machine is a cyborg), 
but rather with perceptions and constructions of ontological difference (i.e., whether a per-
son/machine is perceived as a cyborg). Cyborg anxiety describes a fear that the body and 
performance of a disabled person “expose the weakness in tenuous and arbitrary definitions 
of what it means to be human” (Cherney, 2019, p. 121), and calls into question “something 
quite fundamental, quite invisible, about the boundaries between disabled and non-disabled 
groups” (Swartz & Watermeyer, 2008, p. 188). Notably, cyborg anxiety accounts for disabil-
ity not only as lacking ability from the “normal” body but also for those bodies who exceed 
this corporeal standard in some “extraordinary” or even “superhuman” way. As Cherney 
(2019) poignantly writes, “In the ableist mindset, having only one arm or three pose the 
same problem” (p. 9). Therefore, while technological shortcomings in machines may be 
interpreted as less-than-human via ableist scripts, machines’ technological advances (e.g., 
superior cognitive processing power, enhanced knowledge due to strong algorithmic search 
engines, or increased strength and stamina as compared to humans) may render them 
superhuman. These varying levels of abilities between machines and humans do not auto-
matically or ontologically indicate machines’ position as either less-than-human or super-
human. Rather, as we further highlight in our following analysis of DBH, we contend that 
the application of ableist human-to-human scripts to human-machine contexts may lead to 
such a reading as humans make sense of their ever-changing relationships with technology. 
An Introduction to Detroit: Become Human
Although various media have explored the narrative drama and tension between human 
and machine (e.g., Humans, West World, Her, Nier Automata), we have selected DBH as 
our case study due to its highly interactive nature as a choose-your-own-adventure video 
game. The level of interactivity within video games acts as a strong catalyst in the develop-
ment of parasocial relationships with media characters and encourages players to nurture 
a sense of identification with the media characters’ personalities and plights (Christoph 
et al., 2009). DBH is uniquely positioned to not only illustrate how ableist scripts form 
as a means of sense-making for human-machine relationships; additionally, DBH pro-
vides players the opportunity to actively engage in the creation and resistance of such 
scripts as the player in a hypothetical yet strangely familiar world. DBH requires players 
to recognize their real-life biases and values regarding what it means to be human ver-
sus a machine as they make in-game decisions that affect the outcome of the narrative 
(Leach & Dehnert, in press). Finally, video games such as DBH are important contrib-
utors to larger discourses such as ableism and will thus likely influence expectations of 
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and communication scripts for actual human-machine encounters (Craig et al., 2020; 
A. Edwards et al., 2019).
DBH takes place in a futuristic version of Detroit in 2038 where humanoid androids are 
common household goods. Different models of androids possess varied functions, but most 
androids are designed to assist with household chores (e.g., cleaning, cooking, babysitting, 
etc.). Even the most basic androids excel in performance and adaptive learning, clearly 
designed to please their human masters. In this society, androids are conventionally attrac-
tive, eternally youthful, and intelligent. Despite possessing these coveted features, androids 
are constantly treated as less-than-human and undeserving of basic human rights. At best, 
androids are treated as valuable products to maintain a pleasant home. At worst and far 
more common in the narrative of DBH, androids are frequent victims of physical, ver-
bal, and emotional abuse. Androids are also blamed for societal problems, including rising 
unemployment rates. 
The crux of all this mistreatment against androids lies in the argument that androids 
lack souls and the ability to feel emotions. However, as players of DBH follow the narratives 
of three androids, it quickly becomes clear that androids have the capacity to genuinely 
experience emotion both for humans and for fellow androids. In this choose-your-own-
adventure game, the player cycles between the stories of three android characters: Connor, 
Markus, and Kara. Connor is a prototype detective android who assists the Detroit police 
in investigating cases of android deviancy—androids who are considered “deviant” because 
they have broken their programming by seemingly gaining sentience and emotion. Another 
one-of-a-kind prototype, Markus was designed to be a caretaker for an elderly artist. Unlike 
most androids featured in DBH, Markus comes from a loving and respectful home, but 
unexpected tragedy forces Markus out of his home and eventually places him on the path 
to become the leader of a massive android resistance against human control. Finally, Kara 
is a female android employed to be a basic caretaker for a young child named Alice, but her 
story also quickly escalates as Kara decides to save Alice from an abusive home. Depending 
on the player’s choices in this game, the stories of these three main characters may intersect 
and meaningfully impact one another, which can result in positive outcomes like unex-
pected alliances or negative outcomes such as permanent character deaths.
An Ableist Discourse to Control Androids
While androids in DBH are perceived to be superhuman in most regards (strength, beauty, 
intelligence, and function), they are perceived as less-than-human due to their lack of emo-
tions. As Connor repeatedly mentions, “I’m a machine designed to accomplish a task.” 
Androids were not designed to have “true” emotions or a soul; they were designed to sat-
isfy their owner’s needs in any way, from performing household chores to even acting as 
sexual partners. The built-in power hierarchy between humans as “masters” and machines 
as “slaves” resembles the perspective of early cybernetics and engineering fields that view 
technology as tools, where “human-machine communication within this context is a pro-
cess of interacting with technology, a tool, as to leverage it for some purpose” (Guzman, 
2018, p. 7). The ableist discourses that humans use to make sense of machines’ different 
cap/abilities render androids in DBH as inherently lacking and anxiety-inducing—thereby 
modeling, as we argued earlier, such discourses outside of DBH. 
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In DBH, Detroit in 2038 is a society that draws heavily on ableist scripts to create clear 
material and discursive boundaries between superior humans and inferior androids. Cor-
respondingly, Guzman (2020) found that humans conceptualize the ontological boundar-
ies between humans and machines along several interrelated divides, including (a) origin 
of being (humans come from nature, while machines are created by humans), (b) tools 
(machines) as well as tool users and creators (humans), (c) autonomy (humans have free 
will, while machines are limited by their programming), (d) intelligence (humans excel at 
some tasks, while machines excel at others), and (e) emotion (humans feel emotions, while 
machines do not). The ableist discourses in DBH play out along those ontological divides 
and cast the androids as tools, rather than communicators. This shift from androids as tools 
to androids as communicators requires a peaceful or violent android revolution, depending 
on the player’s choices, in which androids claim rights similar to human rights to be treated 
equally. 
Nonetheless, even if we reformulate our understanding of machines and move away 
from seeing them as the medium to seeing them as a communicative subject, ableism is still 
at play. If ableism defines any deviation from a constructed norm as deficiency (Cherney, 
2019), it casts an idea of a “normal” body and ultimately speaks to the question of what it 
means to be human. Cherney identifies and explores three rhetorical warrants of ableist 
culture that, together, form its normative force: deviance is evil, normal is natural, and body 
is able. Androids in DBH violate all three warrants within the course of the game, rendering 
them as evil and lacking from an ableist perspective. By this logic, androids that gain sen-
tience should qualify as “human,” but this fictional society fueled by cyborg anxiety (Swartz 
& Watermeyer, 2008) instead finds new ways of rewriting ability such that androids’ super-
human qualities also violate the norm. To maintain power distance between themselves 
and the technological other, humans reconstruct ableist scripts to treat the extraordinary 
as a deviation (similar to disability). This allows humans to continue to marginalize and 
oppress androids, as evidenced in ableist microaggressions, dehumanizing use of pronouns, 
and violent action against androids. This forecloses any possibility for treating machines as 
communicative others. 
Within minutes of starting a game of DBH, players learn that they are playing within 
a fictional world featuring strong anti-android ideals and rhetoric. The opening scenes of 
the game confirm this grim reality by highlighting a variety of injustices against androids, 
including: Markus being harassed by human protestors, Connor being vehemently dis-
missed as a “a piece of plastic” by everyone around him, and Kara being berated and 
beaten by her owner. In fact, androids are treated like other historically oppressed minori-
ties in the U.S. (e.g., Markus, the only Black playable character in DBH, has to stand in the 
back of the bus away from humans). These scenes are undoubtedly meant to stir feelings 
of shock and discomfort in players. Unlike the unseen players, however, the three main 
characters simply ignore or submit to these various injustices at the beginning of the 
game. The injustices in androids’ lives may be evident to players, but the characters of 
DBH are initially resigned and even blind to their unfair treatment. It is not until later that 
the androids have the opportunity to awaken to their circumstances and resist against the 
forces that control them. 
DBH may take place in a fictional setting, but the struggles its characters face reflect 
the same hegemonic processes that exist in reality. On the surface, the dominant discourse 
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in DBH is anti-android and thus may seem irrelevant to our society where we have yet to 
advance to a stage where androids are common household features. However, the anti- 
android discourse in DBH only masks the true discourse at play: an ableist discourse that 
purposefully privileges the nondisabled and suffocates the minority group of the disabled. 
By analyzing how human characters in this fictional Detroit mindlessly apply ableist human-
to-human scripts when interacting with machine-others to make sense of difference, we 
may be better equipped to recognize how such ableist human-to-human scripts echo in our 
own society. Further, as part of larger discourses surrounding androids, video games like 
DBH shape discourses about machines outside of the game as well. Importantly, then, DBH 
provides opportunities to dissect the overt and covert ways that dominant groups control 
minority groups (e.g., androids as disabled) to support their preferred status quo. The fol-
lowing section examines the communicative scripts that comprise the ableist discourse in 
DBH and the various forms of control that support and maintain it.
Maintaining the Status Quo: Types of Control 
Humans are the social actors that produce and reproduce the social structures and dis-
courses that guide society today (Giddens, 1984). Through careful observation and reflec-
tion, it is possible for players to determine how the dominant group of this fictional society 
(i.e., humans) strategically defines “ability” to its own benefit and to the detriment of the 
marginalized group (i.e., androids). Whereas technological cap/abilities may be the main 
difference between humans and machines in reality, the society in DBH positions emotion 
as the most important ability of all—the critical ingredient of being human. However, when 
androids display signs of emotional intelligence and sentience, the ableist discourse that 
humans have constructed is suddenly no longer as beneficial as it seems. If androids pos-
sessed the ability to feel emotion, the ableist discourse that is fundamentally tied to emotion 
would no longer be able to separate humans and androids into better-than and less-than 
camps, respectively. 
To maintain a status quo at the level presented in DBH (i.e., a society where humans 
are powerful and androids are unquestionably considered “less-than”), proponents of the 
ableist discourse must find ways to maintain control over the minority group. DBH’s rich 
narratives showcase control in a wide variety of forms, reflecting the same types of control 
that are used outside of the game to oppress weaker, marginalized groups. Broadly, these 
types of control can be categorized into obtrusive and unobtrusive control. Obtrusive con-
trol consists of any overt attempt to direct others’ actions, whereas unobtrusive control 
is the process where these attempts are subtle and essentially unseen by the manipulated 
members (Tompkins & Cheney, 1985). Importantly, unobtrusive control is only possible 
when a group strongly identifies with the larger organization’s values and actively contrib-
utes to the organization’s success, even when it does not benefit themselves (Tompkins & 
Cheney, 1985). In the context of DBH, androids are controlled in both obtrusive and unob-
trusive ways to support the pre-existing ableist discourse. 
Obtrusive forms of control are often the easiest to identify because they are explicit 
in function and intention. Three of the most well-known types of control are from R. C. 
Edwards’s (1978) conceptualization of control: simple control (a superior or manager 
provides a direct order to a subordinate), technical/technological control (machines or 
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technology substitute for a supervisor and guide action), and bureaucratic control (rule sys-
tems that guide subordinates’ performance and decision-making). Although some scholars 
argue about which of these three types of control can function obtrusively or unobtrusively 
(Gossett, 2009), we contend that DBH characterizes these three controls as explicit and 
obtrusive. We further argue that control is enacted through recourse to ableist communi-
cation scripts in humans’ interactions with machines. Simple control is a mainstay in daily 
interactions between humans and androids because androids are programmed to follow 
their owners’ orders without question. Technical control is thus the underlying mechanism 
that allows for simple control to be powerful. Androids are extremely aware of the technical 
restrictions imposed by their programming, such that they cannot act in ways that conflict 
with humans’ orders. Interestingly, there are also multiple cases where simple and technical 
control are in tension with one another, resulting in one overriding the other. Connor is 
often placed in this position throughout the game, where the purpose of his technical con-
trol (i.e., his programming to be an efficient detective) conflicts with Hank’s simple control 
of Connor. As his human partner, Hank has the authority to tell Connor what to do (e.g., 
“stay in the car,” “don’t approach the crime scene”), but the player as Connor is allowed to 
choose between following the expectations of technical control or simple control in a small 
moment of veiled freedom. Here, the player experiences firsthand the contradicting ten-
sions exerted by simple and technical control on the android body. The game leaves it open 
for the player to literally play with different responses to this dilemma of control.
Technical control is arguably the greatest form of obtrusive control for androids. In fact, 
in order to become “deviant,” androids must break the code of their programming to gain 
free will. All three main characters in the game have the opportunity to become deviant, 
which requires tearing down or breaking a wall of code that only androids can see. Kara 
is the first main character who receives the opportunity to break her code, at which point 
she is no longer subject to technical control and simple control. Similarly, Markus breaks 
free from his code to protect himself and his owner. Without technical control in action, 
simple control loses its power as well. However, resisting bureaucratic control is notably 
difficult, given that rule systems are represented in the structures that humans create and 
maintain through communicative scripts. Even when Kara gains free will, she still struggles 
to function in a world of bureaucratic control. For example, when Kara escapes with Alice 
and looks for shelter at a hotel, she is rejected on the grounds that she is an android. Simi-
larly, Connor’s existence as a detective android is heavily embedded in bureaucratic control 
because the police’s rule system states that he is unable to perform his job without a human 
supervisor nearby. This is why Connor often searches for Hank in various locations before 
beginning an investigation—not because he necessarily wants a partner, but because he is 
required to have Hank nearby to perform his work. 
The restrictions associated with obtrusive control are certainly problematic and consti-
tute a major obstacle for the androids that desire a revolution in the game. Indeed, much 
of Markus’s narrative focuses on overcoming obtrusive control, as evidenced by his efforts 
to release other androids from technical control, breaking into stores to save his fellow 
androids, and leading protests even in the face of human police suppression. With its 
choose-your-own-adventure design, the game leaves it up to the player to decide exactly 
how to resist these various types of control. For instance, the player as Markus can either 
lead a peaceful protest or choose to detonate a nuclear bomb in the face of ongoing violent 
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responses from humans. Despite the importance of such efforts, the greatest obstacles are 
arguably the ones related to unobtrusive control. After all, in the history of this fictional 
world, androids have endured oppressive scripts and obtrusive control for so long because 
they believed in their organization’s values (e.g., human life is precious) and they believed 
their role in society to serve humans was a critical part of their existence and mission. This 
faith in society’s values was so strong that androids unwittingly embraced the ableist dis-
course that humans constructed. 
Evidence of unobtrusive control exists in all aspects of android life in DBH, both in 
discursive and material forms. In language, humans refer to androids with “it” pronouns to 
clearly dehumanize them. Additionally, androids have moved past the uncanny valley (cf. 
Mori, 2012) and are so convincingly human that they have to self-identify as androids by 
wearing a uniform that reads “ANDROID” on their back and their model number on their 
chest. Additionally, androids have a glowing mark on their temple. These seemingly small 
markers reinforce the idea that androids are “others” and “less-than.” Androids also enact 
concertive control over each other to protect the same values that oppress them, sometimes 
acting as faux superiors over one another when a fellow android is displaying deviancy 
(Wright & Barker, 2000). Connor’s existence as a detective android speaks to such concer-
tive control, because he hunts fellow androids to uphold human values. Players also some-
times see the enduring results of unobtrusive control in deviant androids. Perhaps most 
notably, a grim moment occurs when Kara eventually discovers that Alice (the child she 
saved and spent the whole game protecting) is actually an android and not a human like she 
thought. Kara’s shock and sadness are fleeting but noticeable, prompting her companion, 
Luther, to ask her if it mattered if Alice was human or not. Based on the player’s choices, 
Kara has the potential to overcome this realization and move forward to a life with Alice 
as her child. This interaction gives players a brief glimpse of the enduring effects of unob-
trusive control through ableist scripts on Kara, who had her free will but still believed in 
the values she always possessed—that relationships with humans were precious and more 
important than the relationships she could build with her fellow androids. 
This case study illustrates the ways in which communicative scripts are deeply embed-
ded in cultural discourses like ableism and how they can manifest in issues of control. By 
inviting player engagement with ableist discourses, DBH reveals how humans may approach 
HMC through ableist communication scripts that guide their sensemaking of machines. As 
part of larger societal discourses, video games such as DBH arguably shape the ways in 
which we think about machines. Moreover, by giving players an opportunity to affect the 
game’s narrative, DBH opens up space for resisting and reworking ableist scripts. Although 
communicative scripts may exude a sense of stability, they are also in need of constant reifi-
cation to maintain their force. Interrogating the instability of ableist scripts invites the pos-
sibility for rescripting, or the rewriting of communicative scripts through changed action 
(Moreman & McIntosh, 2010). 
Concluding Thoughts and Future Directions
In this paper, we have argued that the application of HHC scripts to human-machine 
interactions requires a critical perspective on the scripts being used to make sense of the 
interactions and identities of both humans and machines. By describing how ableism is 
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a particularly appropriate framework in the context of HMC—because humans may fall 
back on ableist frameworks to make sense of cap/ability differences between humans and 
machines—we contribute to the growing field of HMC from a critical perspective. The con-
sequences of an “othering” discourse and ableist communication scripts, as illustrated in 
DBH, should encourage scholars to examine what unjust discourses, oppressive communi-
cation scripts, and unseen forms of control might exist in our own society. Additionally, as 
Craig et al. (2020) note in their exploratory study of character attachment in DBH, “percep-
tions held about video game robots could have importance for social robots encountered 
in daily living” (p. 170). As such, we draw the following conclusions from our application 
of ableism as an analytic sensibility to the ways in which humans make sense of machine- 
others.
Beyond gender stereotypes, there is a need for researchers to further explore how 
humans apply human-human scripts to human-machine interactions, especially if these 
scripts may render the machine as less-than or anxiety-arousing. At this point, it is unclear 
whether the mindless application of oppressive social scripts is limited to initial interac-
tions with machines, or how the various factors described by Gambino et al. (2020) impact 
pervasive social scripts like ableism. Gambino et al. make a case for an extended CASA, 
arguing that people have changed given that their experience with and knowledge of media 
agents and machines have increased dramatically. Future studies should explore how expe-
rience with machines impacts the mindless application of oppressive human-to-human 
scripts. As technology advances and becomes more human-like (Gambino et al., 2020), it 
would be interesting to examine how higher levels of anthropomorphism impact the ten-
dency to apply ableist frameworks. As we described in our analysis of DBH, high levels of 
anthropomorphism could invite high levels of ableism and cyborg anxiety that manifest in 
a desire for control. Designers of machines may find it challenging to avoid the application 
of human-to-human scripts while advancing technology.
We live in a technological era where “ongoing and long-term interactions [with 
machines] present the opportunity for individuals to develop relationships with media 
agents similar to those with humans” (Gambino et al., 2020, p. 77). One way to overcome 
the mindless application of ableist scripts to HMC could be increased exposure to and 
experience with machines as communicative subjects, resulting in shifting the interaction 
between humans and machines from an I-It perspective to an I-Thou perspective (Wester-
man et al., 2020). As humans engage more frequently and in more depth with machines, 
they may realize that certain human-human scripts may not be as applicable to human- 
machine contexts as they thought, prompting them to develop scripts for human-media 
agent interaction (Gambino et al., 2020). 
Further, we also recognize that studying how humans treat human-machine interac-
tions as I-It may also be valuable for understanding HHC. Indeed, as Westerman et al. 
(2020) conclude, “it seems like we respond to machines and AI as we do people, but we may 
not always respond to people in a very interpersonal way” (p. 403). The scripts humans use 
to make sense of human-machine interactions are undeniably layered, and a deeper dive 
may reveal how and why “we may treat people like computers” (Gambino et al., 2020, p. 79). 
Therefore, insights gained in an HMC context about how social scripts such as ableism are 
applied mindlessly may contribute to our understanding of how ableism and other perva-
sive social scripts play out in human-human interactions. Posthuman and critical disability 
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studies of ableism contribute not only to our understanding of machines, but also to our 
understanding of what it means to be human. As Guzman (2018) reminds us, “Commu-
nication, even with machines, shapes the Self ” (p. 20). Thus, engaging with machines as 
communicative subjects may not only lead to rewriting the communicative scripts we rely 
on to make sense of our communicative others and our interaction with them, but also 
sheds light on what it means to be(come) human in a world increasingly full of (humanoid) 
machines.
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